

Identify influential spreaders in complex networks, the role of neighborhood



Ying Liu^{a,b,c}, Ming Tang^{a,d,*}, Tao Zhou^{a,d}, Younghae Do^e

^a Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China

^b School of Computer Science, Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu 610500, China

^c Section for Science of Complex System, Medical University of Vienna, Vienna 1090, Austria

^d Big Data Research Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China

^e Department of Mathematics, Kyungpook National University, Daegu 702-701, South Korea

HIGHLIGHTS

- A centrality measure encoding the centrality of a node's neighborhood is proposed.
- The neighborhood centrality outperforms degree and coreness in ranking spreaders.
- A saturation effect of the neighborhood is discovered.
- Considering the 2-step neighborhood of a node balances the cost and performance.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 2 November 2015

Received in revised form 13 January 2016

Available online 18 February 2016

Keywords:

Epidemic spreading

Influential spreader

Neighborhood centrality

Saturation effect

ABSTRACT

Identifying the most influential spreaders is an important issue in controlling the spreading processes in complex networks. Centrality measures are used to rank node influence in a spreading dynamics. Here we propose a node influence measure based on the centrality of a node and its neighbors' centrality, which we call the neighborhood centrality. By simulating the spreading processes in six real-world networks, we find that the neighborhood centrality greatly outperforms the basic centrality of a node such as the degree and coreness in ranking node influence and identifying the most influential spreaders. Interestingly, we discover a saturation effect in considering the neighborhood of a node, which is not the case of the larger the better. Specifically speaking, considering the 2-step neighborhood of nodes is a good choice that balances the cost and performance. If further step of neighborhood is taken into consideration, there is no obvious improvement and even decrease in the ranking performance. The saturation effect may be informative for studies that make use of the local structure of a node to determine its importance in the network.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Identifying the most influential spreaders is an important step in promoting the adoption of new ideas, products and innovations, and preventing the epidemic disease from being pervasive. Centrality measures are used to rank the importance of a node in a network, such as degree [1], closeness centrality [2], betweenness centrality [3], PageRank centrality [4], LeaderRank centrality [5,6], eigenvector centrality [7], dynamic-sensitive centrality [8,9] and coreness centrality [10]. It

* Corresponding author at: Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China.

E-mail address: tangminghan007@gmail.com (M. Tang).

contains the idea that there is a relationship between the topological position of a node in the network and its influence and capacity in a spreading dynamics. Among them, degree is the simplest way and is most widely used, but it is based only on the local connections of a node. Subsequent research pointed out that the coreness of node k_s as identified by the k -shell decomposition [11] is a more accurate way in ranking node influence [10], which has a low computational complexity of $O(N + E)$ [12], where N is the network size and E is the number of edges. In addition, the k_s index has a good robustness, which means that the relative ranking of the k_s value for the same node remains unchanged when the network structure is incomplete, missing even up to 50% of the edges [10].

It is pointed out that the importance of a node is not determined solely by its direct connections, but also depends on the connections of its neighbors [13]. Research results show that ranking measures by considering the neighborhood of a node are more accurate in identifying the spreading influence of nodes [14–18]. For example, by considering the number of neighbors within 4-step from the node, a local centrality measure is proposed which outperforms the centrality of degree and betweenness [14]. In a recent work, a gravity centrality is proposed which uses the gravity formula to calculate the contribution of neighbors to the centrality of the considered node. This method can effectively identify influential spreaders in real-world networks and artificial networks [18]. The sum of the coreness of the nearest neighbors of a node is a better indicator of node spreading influence than the coreness [19]. In a ranking algorithm of iterative resource allocating, by considering the centrality of neighbors in a resource allocating process, the final resource a node obtains is used to rank its spreading capability. This method shows a great improvement over degree, closeness, and betweenness [20]. In addition, there are works based on counting the number of possible infection paths [21,22] in the neighborhood to determine node influence.

Intuitively, the larger neighborhood is taken into consideration, the more accurately we can predict the spreading outcome of a node. However, in the research of spreading phenomena in social networks, such as the spread of smoking, alcohol consumption, happiness, health screening, it is discovered that on average there is a significant relationship in behaviors between a node and its direct neighbors (1-step neighbor), and up to the neighbors' neighbors' neighbors (3-step neighbor), which is called the three degree of separation [23]. This implies an influence range from the spreading origin to the affected population. In addition, it is a challenging task to collect the complete network information in some real-world networks [15], due to the large amount and the temporal and spatial change of the data, such as Twitter and Facebook. Analyzing a large neighborhood seems unfeasible in such networks.

Given the effect of neighborhood, in this paper we first propose a neighborhood centrality based on the centrality of a node and its neighbors within multiple steps. Specifically, we take the degree and coreness as the benchmark centrality to study the performance of the neighborhood centrality when 1–4 steps of neighbors are considered. We find that in general the neighborhood centrality outperforms the centrality of the node. Furthermore, in most of the studied networks, considering the neighborhood within 2-step will result in a good neighborhood centrality. When the considered steps is greater than 2, the improvement of ranking accuracy is not obvious and even negative. This means a saturation effect of the neighborhood on a node. Discovering the saturation effect is meaningful in that when we consider the effect of neighborhood, taking the 2-step neighborhood into account will balance the cost and effect.

2. Methods

In this part, we first introduce the centrality measures of degree and coreness, which are used as the benchmark centrality. Then we propose the neighborhood centrality based on the degree or coreness of a node and its neighbors. Finally we describe the susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) model used in the spreading process, and give a brief description of the data sets used in the study.

2.1. Degree centrality

The degree centrality of a node i is defined as $k_i = \sum_{j \in G \setminus i} a_{ij}$, where j is a node in the network G , and $a_{ij} = 1$ if there is a link between node i and node j , otherwise $a_{ij} = 0$. Degree is the simplest centrality measure in quantifying node importance. The larger the degree, the more neighbors the node is able to influence directly.

2.2. Coreness centrality

The coreness centrality of a node is obtained in the k -shell decomposition process. The k -shell decomposition method is used to decompose the network into hierarchically ordered shells from the core to the periphery. Initially, nodes with degree $k = 1$ are removed from the network together with their links. After removing all nodes with $k = 1$, there may appear some nodes with only one link left. We continue to remove these nodes until there is no node with one link left in the network. The removed nodes are assigned with an index $k_s = 1$. Next, nodes with degree $k \leq 2$ are removed in a similar way and assigned with an index $k_s = 2$. The pruning process continues removing higher shells until all nodes are removed. As a result, each node is assigned with a k_s value, which is called the coreness of a node. The coreness reflects the location importance of a node in the network. A large k_s means a core position in the network, while a small k_s defines the periphery of the network. Coreness centrality is considered to be a better measure than degree to identify the influential spreaders in a network [10,24].

Table 1

Characteristics of the real-world networks studied in this work. These characteristics include number of nodes (N), number of edges (E), average degree ($\langle k \rangle$), degree assortativity (r), clustering coefficient (C), epidemic threshold (λ_c), infection probability used in the SIR spreading in the main text (λ), average shortest distance of the network (d), average spreading radius (d_R) (see its definition in the main text).

Network	N	E	$\langle k \rangle$	r	C	λ_c	λ	d	d_R
Email	1 133	5 451	9.6	0.078	0.220	0.06	0.08	3.61	2.22
CA-Hep	8 638	24 806	5.7	0.239	0.482	0.08	0.12	5.95	2.93
Hamster	2 000	16 097	16.1	0.023	0.540	0.02	0.04	3.59	2.04
PGP	10 680	24 340	4.6	0.240	0.266	0.06	0.19	7.49	3.69
Astro	14 845	119 652	16.1	0.228	0.670	0.02	0.05	4.8	2.95
Router	5 022	6 258	2.5	−0.138	0.012	0.08	0.27	6.45	3.91

2.3. Neighborhood centrality

We propose a new centrality measure called neighborhood centrality that encodes the centrality of a node and its neighborhood. We consider that the importance of a node depends not only on its direct neighbors (1-step neighbors), but also on its 2-step and even more steps of neighbors. A 2-step neighbor of a node is a direct neighbor of 1-step neighbor. Similarly, a n -step neighbor is a direct neighbor of $(n - 1)$ -step neighbor. The more steps, the larger range of neighborhood is taken into consideration. Meanwhile, the weight of the neighbor's influence may be different. For example, when an infection starts at a seed node, the probability of a neighbor being infected decreases with the increase of its distance from the spreading origin. That is the larger distance, the smaller effect the spreading origin may have on the neighbor. Based on these assumptions, we define the neighborhood centrality of node i encoding the centrality of i and its n -step neighbors as

$$C_i^n(\theta) = \theta_i + a \sum_{j \in \Gamma_i} \theta_j + a^2 \sum_{l \in \Gamma_j \setminus i} \theta_l + a^3 \sum_{m \in \Gamma_l \setminus j} \theta_m + \cdots + a^n \sum_{s \in \Gamma_{s-1} \setminus x} \theta_s, \quad (1)$$

where θ is the benchmark centrality, n is the step of neighbors taken into consideration, a is an adjustable parameter that ranges in $[0, 1]$, and Γ_i is the set of nearest neighbors of node i . In the last item of the equation, s is the direct neighbor of a node o which is the $(s - 1)$ -step neighbor of the considered node i , while the slashed node x is the direct neighbor of node o but is the $(s - 2)$ -step neighbor of i . Here we use degree and coreness as the benchmark centrality, and consider a neighborhood of up to 4-step. This equation means that the neighborhood centrality encodes the centrality of a node and its neighbors. In addition, the neighbors' effect decreases with the increase of their distance from the origin node. In this work, we first set $a = 0.2$ in Eq. (1) and then discuss its impact on the performance of neighborhood centrality when a varies.

2.4. The SIR model

We use the susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) spreading model [25,26] to simulate the spreading processes on networks and record the spreading efficiency for each node. We then compare the performance of the neighborhood centrality with degree and coreness in ranking the spreading efficiency of nodes and identifying influential spreaders. In the SIR model, a node has three possible states: S (susceptible), I (infected) and R (recovered). Initially, a single node is infected and all others are susceptible. The infection spreads from the seed node to other nodes in the network through edges. At each time step, infected nodes contact all their direct neighbors, and then recover (change to R state) with probability μ . For simplicity we set $\mu = 1$. Recovered nodes will not be infected any more and remain the state of recovered until the spreading stops. Susceptible individuals become infected with probability λ when they are contacted by an infected neighbor. The spreading process stops when there is no infected node in the network. The proportion of recovered nodes when spreading stops is considered as the spreading efficiency, or spreading capability, of the origin node. While the final infected population may vary when the infection probability λ varies, authors of Ref. [27] pointed out that the relative ranking of the nodes' spreading efficiency remains invariant under a wide range of infection probabilities. In our simulations, we chose an infection probability $\lambda > \lambda_c$, where $\lambda_c = \langle k \rangle / (\langle k^2 \rangle - \langle k \rangle)$ is the epidemic threshold of the network determined by the heterogeneous mean-field method [28]. Under this infection probability, the final infected population is above 0 and reaches a finite but small fraction of the network size, in the range of 1%–20% [10] for most nodes as spreading origins. We realize the spreading process for 100 times and use the average spreading efficiency of a node as its spreading efficiency M . We also discuss the performance of our proposed method under a mediate range of the infection probability in our result part.

2.5. Data sets

We study the performance of the neighborhood centrality on six real-world networks. The six real-world networks studied are: (1) Email (e-mail network of University at Rovira i Virgili, URV) [29]; (2) CA-Hep (Giant connected component of collaboration network of arXiv in high-energy physics theory) [30]; (3) Hamster (friendships and family links between users of the website) [31]; (4) PGP (an encrypted communication network) [32]; (5) Astro physics (collaboration network of astrophysics scientists) [33]. (6) Router (the router level topology of the Internet, collected by the Rocketfuel Project) [34]. The characteristics of the studied networks are listed in Table 1.




Fig. 1. The imprecision of centrality as a function of p for six real-world networks. The imprecisions of k (black squares), $C^1(k)$ (red circles), $C^2(k)$ (blue uptriangles), $C^3(k)$ (green downtriangles), and $C^4(k)$ (purple lefttriangles) are compared in each network. p is the proportion of nodes calculated, ranging from 0.01 to 0.2. In all studied networks, the lowest imprecision can be achieved within 2-step neighborhood.

3. Results

We study the performance of neighborhood centrality in identifying influential spreaders by considering the node's neighborhood of 1-step, 2-step, 3-step and 4-step, respectively, which are $C^1(\theta)$, $C^2(\theta)$, $C^3(\theta)$, $C^4(\theta)$ as defined in Eq. (1). We use the imprecision function proposed in Ref. [10] to quantify the performance of centrality measures in identifying influential spreaders. The imprecision function is defined as

$$\varepsilon(p) = 1 - \frac{M(p)}{M_{\text{eff}}(p)}, \quad (2)$$

where p is the fraction of network size N ($p \in [0, 1]$). $M(p)$ is the average spreading efficiency of pN nodes with the highest centrality, and $M_{\text{eff}}(p)$ is the average spreading efficiency of pN nodes with the highest spreading efficiency. This function quantifies how close to the optimal spreading is the average spreading of the pN nodes with the highest centrality. The smaller the ε value, the more accurate the centrality is a measure to identify the most influential spreaders.

Here we compare the imprecision of k with $C^1(k)$, $C^2(k)$, $C^3(k)$ and $C^4(k)$, as well as the imprecision of k_S with $C^1(k_S)$, $C^2(k_S)$, $C^3(k_S)$ and $C^4(k_S)$, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. In Fig. 1, we can see that for all studied networks, the lowest imprecision can be achieved at $C^1(k)$ or $C^2(k)$. In Email and CA-Hep, the neighborhood centrality outperforms the degree centrality at most p values, and the imprecisions are very close under all steps considered. In Hamster and PGP, the imprecision of $C^1(k)$ and $C^2(k)$ are very close, and are lower than k , $C^3(k)$ and $C^4(k)$. In Astro the imprecision of $C^1(k)$ is the lowest, while in Router the imprecision of $C^2(k)$ is the lowest. In all, the $C(k)$ outperforms degree k , and a best neighborhood centrality is achieved when considering the neighbors in 1-step or 2-step for all the studied networks. When a larger step of 3 or 4 is considered, the performance of neighborhood even decreases. This demonstrates a saturation effect when considering the neighborhood of a node in determining its centrality.

When using the k_S as the benchmark centrality, a similar saturation effect emerges as shown in Fig. 2. In Email, CA and Hamster, the neighborhood centrality outperforms the coreness centrality, and are very close under all steps considered. In PGP, the imprecision of $C^1(k_S)$ and $C^2(k_S)$ are very close, and in general lower than that of k_S , $C^3(k_S)$ and $C^4(k_S)$. In Astro, the imprecision of $C^2(k_S)$, $C^3(k_S)$ and $C^4(k_S)$ are very close and smaller than k_S and $C^1(k_S)$, except some p values. In Router, $C^2(k_S)$ and $C^3(k_S)$ have the lowest imprecision performance. In general, the $C(k_S)$ outperforms k_S and a best performance can be achieved when considering the neighborhood within 2-step.

The imprecision function demonstrates the improved performance of neighborhood centrality in identifying the most influential spreaders. To evaluate the ranking capability of the topology-based neighborhood centrality on the spreading efficiency of nodes, we use the Kendall's tau correlation coefficient [35]. The Kendall's tau correlation coefficient is used to measure the ranking correlation of a same set in two ranking lists. It counts the number of concordant ranking pairs and the number of discordant ranking pairs in the two ranking lists. The correlation coefficient is defined as

$$\tau = \frac{\sum_{i < j} \text{sgn}[(x_i - x_j)(y_i - y_j)]}{\frac{1}{2}N(N-1)}, \quad (3)$$




Fig. 2. The imprecision of centrality as a function of p for six real-world networks. The imprecisions of k_s (black squares), $C^1(k_s)$ (red circles), $C^2(k_s)$ (blue uptriangles), $C^3(k_s)$ (green downtriangles), and $C^4(k_s)$ (purple lefttriangles) are compared in each network. p is the proportion of nodes calculated, ranging from 0.01 to 0.2. In all studied networks, the lowest imprecision can be achieved within 2-step neighborhood.

where $\text{sgn}(x)$ is a sign function, which returns 1 if $x > 0$, -1 if $x < 0$, and 0 if $x = 0$. Here N is the number of nodes in the list. x_i and x_j is the rank of node i and node j in ranking list 1, while y_i and y_j is the rank of node i and node j in ranking list 2. If node i and node j have a concordant rank in ranking list 1 and 2, $(x_i - x_j)(y_i - y_j) > 0$. If node i and node j have a discordant rank in ranking list 1 and 2, $(x_i - x_j)(y_i - y_j) < 0$. If node i and node j have a same rank in ranking list 1 and 2, $(x_i - x_j)(y_i - y_j) = 0$. We take the topology-based ranking, that is the centrality measure, as ranking list 1 and the spreading-based ranking, that is the simulated spreading efficiency of nodes, as ranking list 2, and calculate the correlation coefficient. A large correlation coefficient implies a more concordant relation between the centrality and the spreading efficiency.

To make an explicit comparison, we calculate the improved tau ratio of the neighborhood centrality over the benchmark centrality, which is

$$\eta_\theta = \begin{cases} \frac{\tau_{C(\theta)} - \tau_\theta}{\tau_\theta} & \tau_\theta > 0 \\ \frac{\tau_{C(\theta)} - \tau_\theta}{-\tau_\theta} & \tau_\theta < 0 \\ 0 & \tau_\theta = 0, \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

where θ is the benchmark centrality of k and k_s , $\tau_{C(\theta)}$ is the correlation coefficient between the neighborhood centrality and spreading efficiency, τ_θ is the correlation coefficient between the benchmark centrality and spreading efficiency. The improved tau ratio measures the increase of correlation for $C(k)$ over k ($C(k_s)$ over k_s). As our main interest lies on the most influential spreaders, when we calculate the Kendall's tau correlation coefficient here we only take the top ranked pN nodes by centrality into calculation. In Fig. 3, the η_k of $C(k)$ over k for top ranked pN nodes is demonstrated, where p is in the range of 0.1–0.5 and the $C(k)$ is calculated from 1-step to 4-step of the neighborhood. We can see that in general, the largest improved tau ratio is achieved within 2-step neighborhood. In Email, CA-Hep and Hamster, η_k is greater than 0, and for most p values the largest η_k lies at 2-step. In PGP, the largest η_k lies at 1-step when the top ranked 10% and 20% nodes are considered, while for other p values, the largest η_k lies at 2-step or 3-step. In Astro, considering the 1-step neighborhood will come to the largest η_k for all p values. In Router, the largest η_k lies at 2-step or 3-step for all p values. In all, by considering the neighborhood of 1-step or 2-step, the $C(k)$ has an increased ranking performance over k .

Similarly, the improved tau ratio η_{k_s} of $C(k_s)$ over k_s for top ranked pN nodes is demonstrated in Fig. 4. In all networks except PGP, the largest η_{k_s} lies at 2-step for most of the p values. In PGP the largest η_{k_s} lies at 1-step for $p = 0.1$ and $p = 0.2$, and when it comes to 3-step, the correlation decreases, which is reflected by a negative η_{k_s} . It is worth noticing that in Email, CA-Hep and Hamster, the η_{k_s} is very large in absolute value for $p = 0.1$. As indicated in Refs. [27,36], in networks of Email, CA-Hep and Hamster, the k_s fails to identify the top ranked nodes in spreading efficiency. Thus the Kendall's tau correlation coefficient of k_s and spreading efficiency for top ranked nodes in Email, CA-Hep and Hamster is very low, and is even negative for Email. In Email, the correlation coefficient of k_s and node spreading efficiency for top 10% nodes ranked by k_s is -0.08 , and the correlation coefficient of $C^1(k_s)$ and the node's spreading efficiency for top 10% nodes ranked by $C^1(k_s)$ is 0.55, thus $\eta_{k_s} \approx 788\%$ for $p = 0.1$. In PGP and Router, the negative value of η_{k_s} means that the ranking correlation of $C(k_s)$ is smaller than that of k_s .




Fig. 3. The improved tau ratio η_k of $C^s(k)$ over k as a function of s for six real-world networks. s is the step of neighborhood considered. p is the proportion of top ranked nodes by centrality that are calculated in Kendall's tau correlation coefficient, ranging from 0.1 to 0.5. In general, a largest increase in ranking correlation appears at 1-step or 2-step. Although in the networks of CA-Hep, PGP and Router there is some increase of η_k at some p values for the 3-step, the increase is relatively small.




Fig. 4. The improved tau ratio η_{k_s} of $C(k_s)$ over k_s as a function of s for six real-world networks. s is the step of neighborhood considered. p is the proportion of top ranked nodes by centrality that are calculated in Kendall's tau correlation coefficient, ranging from 0.1 to 0.5. In general, a largest increase in ranking correlation appears at 1-step or 2-step. Although in the networks of Email, PGP and Router there is some increase of η_{k_s} at some p values for the 3-step, the increase is relatively small.

In general, in all the studied six real-world networks, the neighborhood centrality outperforms the degree centrality and coreness centrality, and there exists a saturation effect when considering a node's neighborhood, which mostly occurs at 2-step. As the above results are obtained when using the parameter $a = 0.2$ and the infection probability of λ listed in Table 1, we test the performance under a wide range of the parameter a and the infection probability respectively, and the results seem similar.

The saturation effect of the neighborhood centrality may be explained by the spreading radius d_i , which is defined as the average shortest distance from the R nodes to the spreading origin of node i in a spreading process. Then we average over all nodes i to get the average spreading radius d_R , where node i belongs to the set of the top ranked 20% nodes by their real spreading efficiencies, as listed in Table 1. We can see that d_R is between 2 and 4, which means the final infected nodes are on average 2–4 steps away from the spreading origin under the infection probability λ . This implies that a node usually has an action scope. Considering neighbors within the scope will work, while considering neighbors out of this scope is less meaningful.




Fig. 5. The improved tau ratio η_k (η_{k_s}) of $C^2(k)$ ($C^2(k_s)$) over k (k_s) as a function of parameter a in six real-world networks. The top ranked 20% nodes by centrality are calculated in Kendall's tau correlation coefficient ($p = 0.2$). In all networks except Router, η_k and η_{k_s} are relatively stable over all $a > 0$. In Router, the η_k is greater than 0 under all $a > 0$. The η_{k_s} is greater than 0 at $a = 0.1$ and $a = 0.2$ and then decreases to negative values.




Fig. 6. The improved tau ratio η_k (η_{k_s}) of $C^2(k)$ ($C^2(k_s)$) over k (k_s) as a function of parameter a in six real-world networks. All nodes in a network are calculated in Kendall's tau correlation coefficient ($p = 1.0$). η_k and η_{k_s} are relatively stable under all $a > 0$.

Now we concentrate on the $C^2(k)$ and $C^2(k_s)$, since in most cases they result in the best neighborhood centrality. We discuss the impact of the tunable parameter a on the neighborhood centrality. We study the improved tau ratio of $C^2(k)$ over k and $C^2(k_s)$ over k_s respectively at different a values. As shown in Fig. 5, we first focus on the top 20% nodes ranked by neighborhood centrality. $a = 0$ corresponds to k or k_s . For η_k and η_{k_s} in Email, CA-Hep, Hamster and Astro, they are stable under all $a > 0$ values. In PGP, there is some fluctuation at $a = 0.2$. As for Router, there is an obvious decrease at $a = 0.4$, but the η_k is always above 0. When all nodes of the network are taken into consideration, the improved tau ratio η is very stable under all $a > 0.2$ values, as shown in Fig. 6. This implies that taking the neighborhood into consideration is quite effective, but the distance of neighbors is less important.

Finally, we move to explore the dependence of η on the infection probability λ . We still focus on the $C^2(k)$ and $C^2(k_s)$. We present the η_k and η_{k_s} as a function of the infection probability, which is q times of the epidemic threshold λ_c , where q ranges from 1.0 to 3.0. As indicated by authors of Refs. [10,27], the relative ranking of the spreading efficiency of nodes are not significantly influenced by the choice of infection probability in the spreading process. In addition, the infection probability should not be too large, otherwise the topological importance of the spreading origin is diminished, since under a large infection probability, nodes with low centrality will be influential too, because there is a large chance that the disease spreads from the less influential spreaders to the more influential spreaders and then spreads to the large part of the net-




Fig. 7. The improved tau ratio η_k (η_{k_s}) of $C^2(k)$ ($C^2(k_s)$) over k (k_s) as a function of q times of the epidemic threshold λ_c . q ranges from 1.0 to 3.0. In most cases, the η is greater than 0. There is a small negative value of η_k at large q values in Email, CA-Hep and Hamster, and a small negative value of η_{k_s} at small q values in Router.




Fig. 8. The improved tau ratio η_k (η_{k_s}) of $C^2(k)$ ($C^2(k_s)$) over k (k_s) as a function of q times of the epidemic threshold λ_c . q ranges from 1.0 to 3.0. The improved tau ratio is greater than 0 in all studied networks and infection probability, except a small negative η_k at three times the epidemic threshold in Email.

work [10]. The result of considering the top 20% nodes ranked by centrality is shown in Fig. 7. In all networks except Router, the η is greater than 0 at most infection probabilities. For Router, η_k is greater than 0 under all infection probabilities. The η_{k_s} is under 0 at some infection probabilities, but above 0 when $q = 2.5$ and $q = 3$. Although there is some fluctuation, the ranking correlation of $C(k)$ and $C(k_s)$ is higher than that of k and k_s in most cases. When all nodes of the network are taken into consideration, as shown in Fig. 8, the η is greater than 0 under all infection probabilities except a very small negative value at 3 times of the λ_c for η_k in Email network. These results validate that the neighborhood centrality has a better performance than the benchmark centrality in a wide range of infection probability.

4. Conclusion and discussion

Centrality measures are used in identifying influential spreaders. Here we propose a new centrality measure called neighborhood centrality, which encodes the centrality of a node and its neighbors. By simulating the SIR spreading process on six real-world networks, we find that the proposed neighborhood centrality outperforms the centrality of degree and coreness, which are two most widely used and simplest centrality measures, in identifying the influential spreaders.

Furthermore, as we take the neighborhood of a node into consideration, we find that counter-intuitively, it is not the case of the more the better. In most cases, considering the neighborhood of a node within 2-step leads to a good performance while considering more steps of neighborhood does not obviously improve the performance or even results in some decrease. This demonstrates a saturation effect in considering the neighborhood, which coincides with the finding of three degrees of separation in social science [23], in the sense that our way of considering the 2-step neighbors encodes the information of the 3-step neighbors. The saturation effect may relate to the spreading radius of nodes, which is the average shortest distance from the infected nodes to the spreading origin. We also validate that the performance of the neighborhood centrality is stable under all values of the introduced parameter a when $a > 0$, as well as under a wide range of infection probabilities, which indicates a robustness of the proposed method.

Identifying influential spreaders is a fundamental question which has wide applications in different fields of reality, such as epidemic control, information diffusion, idea populating, etc. Centrality measures such as degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality are heuristic methods used to identify influential spreaders. Besides, there are other ways of identifying influential spreaders, such as the path counting and the expected cluster degree [37]. These methods have different computational complexity and require different network information [38]. For example, the degree centrality only needs the local information of a node and has a low computational complexity of $O(E)$. The betweenness and closeness centrality need the full network information and have a high complexity of $O(N^3)$. The path counting method is time-consuming thus it usually needs to specify a path length value. Our method of calculating the neighborhood centrality has a complexity of $O(E)$, given the degree and coreness of each node is known, which is relatively low. In addition, different measures may contain distinct information. For example, the closeness centrality measures how central a node is in terms of its distance from all other nodes, while the PageRank centrality measures the probability of a random walker visiting a node on webs. How to choose a best indicator relies on what information we have and what kind of spreader we are searching for. As the neighborhood centrality is based on degree and coreness, how it will perform if we use other centrality measures as the benchmark centrality needs to be further explored. There still leaves much space to explore the influential spreaders.

There are a variety of real-world networks that consist of self-repeating patterns under different length scales, which are called fractal networks, such as the world-wide web, the actor collaboration network, the protein–protein interaction network and the cellular network [39]. The main feature of the fractal network is the repulsion between hub nodes, which makes the hub nodes tend not to connect to hub nodes [40,41]. In our algorithm, hub nodes will have little contribution to other hubs' neighborhood centrality due to their large distance in fractal networks. Besides, nodes that directly connect to hubs may be ranked high in this algorithm, because they will receive relatively more centrality contributions from the hubs due to the high degree of the hubs and the short distance from them. However, fractal networks have different degree distributions, degree correlations and modular features from non-fractal networks. How our algorithm will perform on real-world fractal networks may relate to their fractal dimensions and distance between self-similar modules, which still needs further research.

Many research works make use of the neighborhood information to explore the structural and functional characteristics of nodes, such as decomposing and identifying the core–periphery structure of the network [42–44], predicting missing links [45] and devising immunization strategies [46–48]. We hope that the findings in this work will help to improve the researches by taking a suitable neighborhood range into consideration.

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 11575041, 61433014), the Scientific Research Starting Program of Southwest Petroleum University (No. 2014QHZ024), the Chinese Scholarship Council under No. 201406070071, the Data Intelligence Academic Innovation Team of SWPU (2015CXTD06) and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2013R1A1A2010067).

References

- [1] L.C. Freeman, Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification, *Social Networks* 1 (1978) 215.
- [2] G. Sabidussi, The centrality index of a graph, *Psychometrika* 31 (1966) 581.
- [3] L.C. Freeman, A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness, *Sociometry* 40 (1977) 35.
- [4] S. Brin, L. Page, The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine, *Comput. Netw.* 30 (1998) 107.
- [5] L. Lü, Y.C. Zhang, C.H. Yeung, T. Zhou, Leaders in social networks, the delicious case, *PLoS One* 6 (2011) e21202.
- [6] Q. Li, T. Zhou, L. Lü, D. Chen, Identifying influential spreaders by weighted LeaderRank, *Physica A* 404 (2014) 47–55.
- [7] P. Bonacich, P. Lloyd, Eigenvector-like measures of centrality for asymmetric relations, *Social Networks* 23 (2001) 191.
- [8] K. Klemm, M.Á. Serrano, V.M. Eguíluz, M.S. Miguel, A measure of individual role in collective dynamics, *Sci. Rep.* 2 (2012) 292.
- [9] J.H. Lin, Q. Guo, J.G. Liu, T. Zhou, Locating influential nodes via dynamics-sensitive centrality, *arXiv e-print*, 2015. [arXiv:1504.06672](https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.06672).
- [10] M. Kitsak, L.K. Gallos, S. Havlin, F. Liljeros, L. Muchnik, H.E. Stanley, H.A. Makse, Identification of influential spreaders in complex networks, *Nat. Phys.* 6 (2010) 888.
- [11] B. Bollobás, *Graph Theory and Combinatorics: Proc. Cambridge Combinatorial Conf. in honor of P. Erdős*, Academic Press, NY, 1984.
- [12] V. Batagelj, M. Zaveršnik, An $O(m)$ algorithm for cores decomposition of networks, *arXiv e-print* 2003. [arXiv:cs/0310049](https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0310049).
- [13] M.E.J. Newman, *Networks: An introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
- [14] D.B. Chen, L. Lü, M.S. Shang, Y.C. Zhang, T. Zhou, Identifying influential nodes in complex networks, *Physica A* 391 (2012) 1777.
- [15] S. Pei, L. Muchnik, J.S. Andrade, Z.M. Zheng, H.A. Makse, Searching for superspreaders of information in real-world social media, *Sci. Rep.* 4 (2014) 5547.
- [16] F. Morone, H.A. Makse, Influence maximization in complex networks through optimal percolation, *Nature* 524 (2015) 65.

- [17] Y.Q. Hu, S.G. Ji, L. Feng, Y.L. Jin, Quantify and maximise global viral influence through local network information, arXiv e-print, 2015. arXiv:1509.0348.
- [18] L.L. Ma, C. Ma, H.F. Zhang, B.H. Wang, Identifying influential spreaders in complex networks based on gravity formula, *Physica A* 451 (2016) 205.
- [19] J. Bae, S. Kim, Identifying and ranking influential spreaders in complex networks by neighborhood coreness, *Physica A* 395 (2014) 549.
- [20] Z.M. Ren, A. Zeng, D.B. Chen, H. Liao, J.G. Liu, Iterative resource allocation for ranking spreaders in complex networks, *Europhys. Lett.* 106 (2014) 48005.
- [21] F. Bauer, J.T. Lizier, Identifying influential spreaders and efficiently estimating infection numbers in epidemic models: A walk counting approach, *Europhys. Lett.* 99 (2012) 68007.
- [22] G. Lawyer, Understanding the spreading power of all nodes in a network: a continuous-time perspective, arXiv e-print, 2014. arXiv:1405.6707.
- [23] N.A. Christakis, J.H. Fowler, Social contagion theory: examining dynamic social networks and human behaviors, *Stat. Med.* 32 (2012) 556.
- [24] A. Garas, P. Argyrakis, C. Rozenblat, M. Tomassini, S. Havlin, Worldwide spreading of economic crisis, *New J. Phys.* 12 (2010) 113043.
- [25] R.M. Anderson, R.M. May, *Infectious Diseases in Humans*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.
- [26] Y. Moreno, R. Pastor-Satorras, A. Vespignani, Epidemic outbreaks in complex heterogeneous networks, *Eur. Phys. J. B* 26 (2002) 521.
- [27] Y. Liu, M. Tang, T. Zhou, Y. Do, Core-like groups result in invalidation of identifying super-spreader by k -shell decomposition, *Sci. Rep.* 5 (2015) 9602.
- [28] C. Castellano, R. Pastor-Satorras, Thresholds for epidemic spreading in networks, *Phys. Rev. Lett.* 105 (2010) 218701.
- [29] R. Guimera, L. Danon, A. Diaz-Guilera, F. Giralt, A. Arenas, Self-similar community structure in a network of human interactions, *Phys. Rev. E* 68 (2003) 065103.
- [30] J. Leskovec, J. Kleinberg, C. Faloutsos, Graph evolution: Densification and shrinking diameters, *ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data (ACM TKDD)* 1 (2007) 1.
- [31] J. Kunegis, Hamsterster full network dataset—KONECT, 2014. Available at: <http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/petster-hamster> (Accessed: 01/03/2014).
- [32] M. Boguñá, R. Pastor-Satorras, A. Diaz-Guilera, A. Arenas, Models of social networks based on social distance attachment, *Phys. Rev. E* 70 (2004) 056122.
- [33] M.E.J. Newman, The structure of scientific collaboration networks, *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* 98 (2001) 404.
- [34] N. Spring, R. Mahajan, D. Wetherall, T. Anderson, Measuring ISP topologies with Rocketfuel, *IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.* 12 (2004) 2.
- [35] M. Kendall, A new measure of rank correlation, *Biometrika* 30 (1938) 81.
- [36] Y. Liu, M. Tang, T. Zhou, Y. Do, Improving the accuracy of the k -shell method by removing redundant links: From a perspective of spreading dynamics, *Sci. Rep.* 5 (2015) 13172.
- [37] G. Lawyer, Measuring node spreading power by expected cluster degree, arXiv e-print, 2012. arXiv:1209.6600.
- [38] P. Shen, H.A. Makse, Spreading dynamics in complex networks, *J. Stat. Mech.* 12 (2013) P12002.
- [39] C. Song, S. Havlin, H.A. Makse, Self-similarity of complex networks, *Nature* 433 (2006) 392.
- [40] C. Song, S. Havlin, H.A. Makse, Origins of fractality in the growth of complex networks, *Nat. Phys.* 2 (2006) 275.
- [41] L.K. Gallos, C. Song, H.A. Makse, A review of fractality and self-similarity in complex networks, *Physica A* 386 (2007) 686.
- [42] A. Garas, F. Schweitzer, S. Havlin, A k -shell decomposition method for weighted networks, *New J. Phys.* 14 (2012) 083030.
- [43] M. Eidsaa, E. Almaas, S-core network decomposition: A generalization of k -core analysis to weighted networks, *Phys. Rev. E* 88 (2013) 062819.
- [44] M.P. Rombach, M.A. Porter, J.H. Fowler, P.J. Mucha, Core-periphery structure in networks, *SIAM J. Appl. Math.* 74 (2014) 167.
- [45] T. Zhou, L. Lü, Y.-C. Zhang, Predicting missing links via local information, *Eur. Phys. J. B* 71 (2009) 623.
- [46] M. Salathé, J.H. Jones, Dynamics and control of diseases in networks with community structure, *PLoS Comput. Biol.* 6 (2010) e1000736.
- [47] H. Yang, M. Tang, H.F. Zhang, Efficient community-based control strategies in adaptive networks, *New J. Phys.* 14 (2012) 123017.
- [48] H.F. Zhang, J.R. Xie, M. Tang, Y.C. Lai, Suppression of epidemic spreading in complex networks by local information based behavioral responses, *Chaos* 24 (2014) 043106.